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Case No. 20090862-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
VICTOR Rios, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated burglary, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 2004), and 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES1 
1. Whether the trial court committed plain error in submitting the case to 
the jury where the evidence and governing law support that Defendant formed 
the intent to assault the victim while he unlawfully remained within the 
premises? 
Standard of Review. "As a general rule, [the appellate court] will not 
consider a defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim if the defendant has 
failed to raise it before the trial court absent, inter alia, a demonstration by the 
defendant that the trial court committed plain error by submitting the case to 
the jury." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 1 12, 55 P.3d 1131 (quoting State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,117,10 P.3d 346), cert, denied, 63 P.3d 104 (brackets added)). 
Defendant raised two issues on appeal, the second of which— Point II — 
the State does not address. At Point II, Defendant argues at length that "the 
common law and Utah law both require a surreptitious element to be part of the 
'remaining unlawfully7 component of burglary." Aplt. Br. at 32 (heading). 
However, Because Defendant neither raised this issue in the trial court nor 
argues plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, the Court, too, 
should decline to consider it. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, | 13, 95 P.3d 276 
("[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including 
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances.") (citing 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11,10 P.3d 346). 
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STATUTES 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, -103 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, -203 (West 2004)1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 17,2009, Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated 
burglary and one count of aggravated assault. Rl. A jury found Defendant 
guilty on both counts. R50-51, 99, 131:17. Defendant was sentenced to 
concurrent prison terms of five-years-to-life and zeto-to-five-years. R110-111. 
Defendant timely appealed. R116. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
case to this Court. R120. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's Case 
On March 15, 2009, 59-year-old Joy Vanttyke was staying at the 
Courtyard Inn on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah. R130:57-58. She heard knocks at 
the door "late at night/' but did not initially respond because she was not 
expecting anybody. R130:59, 74. "Finally, the third time [she] answered the 
door" without looking out the peephole, because it was "around 1 o'clock" in 
the morning and she "was angry by then." R130:59, 74-75. Ms. VanDyke 
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identified Defendant as the stranger standing at the door. R130:59-60. He asked 
her if she had "a joint" — a marijuana cigarette. R130:59,60,75,76. She laughed 
and informed him that she did not have "any joints[; o]nly cigarettes." R130:60. 
She offered him a cigarette, at which time her dog began "trying to bite his feet. 
.. kind of trying to attack him." R130:60-61. 
While Ms. VanDyke quieted her dog and turned around to grab a pack of 
cigarettes, Defendant, without permission, stepped into the room. R130:61,73. 
She gave him the cigarettes and told him to "get out." R130:63, 77-78. Instead, 
he moved closer towards her, even as Ms. VanDyke kept saying, "Go. Get out. 
Get out. Go." R130:63. Defendant then reached into his pocket and gave her 
two dollars, but Ms. VanDyke responded that she did not want the money: 
"Just keep the money. Just get out." R130:63, 69, 79. Defendant "kind of 
meandered toward the door," but when he reached the door he turned around 
as though he was having "second thoughts." R130:63,79. Ms. VanDyke shoved 
him to get him out so that she could slam the door. R130:63,79. Before she was 
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able to do so, "he turned around and slugged [her] in the forehead." R130:32, 
63, 79; Exhibit PI.2 
As Ms. VanDyke fell to the floor, Defendant closed the door, jumped on 
top of her, and choked her. R130:63, 80. She kicked and clawed at Defendant 
and screamed as loud as she could, "Help, help. Help me/' R130:64. When 
Defendant covered Ms. VanDyke's mouth with his hand, she bit it. Id. 
Struggling for breath, she tried to pry Defendant's fingers from her neck one at a 
time. R130:65. She screamed in the brief intervals that she was able to remove 
his grip. Id. She "was kind of fighting-the only thing [she] had left to fight with 
was [her] feet." R130:65. 
During the struggle, Ms. VanDyke intermittently blacked out. R130:66. 
The struggle "seemed like it lasted forever," but" [a]U of a sudden he just got up 
off of [her] and walked out the door and left." R130:66-67. At that point, she got 
up and called 911, describing her assailant as an Hispanic male, 5'6" or 5'7" tall, 
weighing 160 pounds, wearing a plaid shirt and blue jeans, and who did not 
speak English very well. R130:23, 67, 76, 90. 
2
 Exhibits in the trial transcript are frequently identified by the letter, "D" 
and its associated number. See e.g., R130:32, referencing Exhibit "D2." Such 
identification is mistaken, as all the exhibits were introduced by the State 
("Plaintiff"), the labels identify the exhibits as "Plaintiff's Exhibit," and close 
inspection shows that the "D" is actually a "P." Accordingly, all citation to 
exhibits in this brief identifies them as "P#," regardless of their identification in 
the transcript. 
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Officer Steve Zaccardi of the Ogden City Police Department responded to 
a dispatch call at 1:13 in the morning the next day, March 16. R130:14-15. A call 
had come in from the Courtyard Inn on 25th Street; the caller reported hearing a 
struggle in a room and a woman calling for help. R130:16,48,90. As the officer 
approached the hotel, he encountered a man who also reported having heard a 
woman screaming for help. R130:17-21. Officer Zaccardi then responded to 
room 253 in the hotel, the room to which he had been dispatched. R130:21. 
Upon inviting the officer into her room, Ms. VanDyke told Officer 
Zaccardi that she had been attacked by a man knocking on the door and asking 
for cigarettes. R130:22. She described her assailant much as she did to the 911 
operator. R130:22-23. Officer Zaccardi noticed on the floor by the doorway 
several boxes that were knocked over. Ms. VanDyke explained that she was in 
the process of moving to a new location, but that the disarray had all happened 
during the incident. R130:23-24, 58; Exhibit P16. Ms. VanDyke additionally 
provided officers with two one-dollar bills — stating that they were not hers — as 
well as "the pack of cigarettes" she had given to Defendant. R130:36,41; Exhibit 
P25. 
Officer Micah Stephens of the Ogden City Police Department also 
responded to the dispatch concerning the incident. R130:89-90. In one of the 
hotel's stairwells, he found a man matching the description of the sought-after 
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suspect R130:90-91. Ms. VanDyke stepped out on the landing, and Officer 
Zaccardi shined his light on the suspect, who was probably 20 to 30 feet away. 
R130:34, 94-95. When asked if she could identify him, Ms. VanDyke said, 
without hesitation, "100 percent that's the guy." R130:34. 
Officer Zaccardi described Ms. VanDyke as 'Very upset, . . . very 
distraught, "but also as 'Very certain of her statements, and... of the person she 
identified." R130:42-43. Officer Zaccardi took Ms. VanDyke back to the police 
station to give a statement. There, he noticed a bruise on her forehead, marks on 
her neck, scratches on her arms, a cut on her hand, and some scrapes on her 
elbows. R130:30; Exhibits P1-P8, P29. At trial, Ms. VakiDyke identified photos of 
her various injuries and confirmed that they occurred during the assault. 
R13070-72; Exhibits P1-P8. 
A security guard at the El Mirador Bar, located on the same street at Ms. 
VanDyke7s apartment, had escorted Defendant from the bar at some time 
between 12:00 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. on the morning in question. R130:85, 87. 
According to the guard, Defendant had no injuries I at that time. R130:85-86. 
Photographs taken of Defendant when he was apprehended showed injuries 
consisting of red marks and scratches on his neck and scratches on his arms and 
elbows. R130:35-36, 98; Exhibits P10-14. 
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Ms. VanDyke "absolutely" identified the plaid shirt as the one worn by 
Defendant during the attack. R130:67-68; Exhibit P9. The security guard also 
testified that the shirt Defendant was wearing when he was apprehended was 
''similar'' to the shirt he was wearing when he was escorted from the bar. 
R130:85. The guard further stated that Defendant's shirt was intact when he 
escorted Defendant from the bar. 130:85-86. A photograph taken of Defendant 
when he was apprehended showed Defendant's shirt with missing buttons. 
R130:96-97; Exhibit P15. But according to Officer Zaccardi, at the time 
Defendant was apprehended, "it look[ed] like all the buttons got ripped off." 
R130:36, 39-40. Five "kind of multi-colored" buttons were recovered from the 
scene, one with thread still connected to it. R130:24-29, 39, 58, 96-97; Exhibits 
P17-24. 
When Officer Stephens encountered Defendant in the stairwell and asked 
him if he was a guest in the hotel, Defendant answered that he had been 
drinking with a friend. R130:92. Defendant refused to divulge the name of the 
friend with whom he had been drinking or the friend's room number. R130:92-
93. He did, however, say "a couple of times that he was sorry, and it was his 
fault," but when asked what he meant, Defendant would respond only that he 
had been drinking. Id. Although Defendant's command of English appeared to 
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be "limited/' his responses to Officer Stephens' questions indicated that he 
understood what he was being asked. R130:93-94 
The Defense 
Defendant claimed that Ms. VanDyke initiated their contact by calling 
from her window to solicit some marijuana from him and that after he entered 
her hotel room—at her invitation— she tried to steal it from him. R130:105-106, 
108-109. (A small amount of marijuana— .5 gram4 was found on Defendant's 
person when he was later searched. R130:102.) Though Defendant's testimony 
at trial differed from Ms. VanDyke's in the way their encounter began, he 
admitted that he entered her room and grabbed her "really strong." R130:106-
107,110-112,121. 
According to Defendant, upon entering Ms. VanDyke's room, he gave her 
the marijuana to prepare a marijuana "cigarette." R130:106. Then, Defendant 
asked for a "regular cigarette" and paid her two dollars for a pack, despite 
having provided the marijuana at no charge. R130:107,118. There was more 
than enough marijuana for two joints, which they were both going to smoke, the 
remainder of which Defendant would keep. R13Q:118-119. However, Ms. 
VanDyke tried to take the marijuana by holding Onto it and trying to push 
Defendant out of the room. R130:110,119. He grabbed Ms. VanDyke's shirt 
"really strong" and her hands to pry the marijuana from her. R130:110-12,120-
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21. Defendant denied hitting her with his fists or grabbing her throat with his 
hands and choking her. R130:lll-12,119. Rather, Defendant claimed that he 
only grabbed Ms. VanDyke's clothing. R130:lll-112,119-120. Defendant also 
denied having told Officer Stephens that ''it was [his] fault/7 R130:115. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has failed to show that the trial court plainly erred in 
submitting the case to the jury. Defendant concedes that a reasonable jury could 
have found all the statutory elements of aggravated burglary with the exception 
of one novel element. He concedes "unlawful remaining" upon his being asked 
to leave the premises and then being shoved by the victim toward the door. He 
concedes "intent to assault" when he lashed out violently at the victim. And he 
concedes having caused "bodily injury" during his assault. Indeed, the facts of 
the case and Defendant's unchallenged conviction for aggravated assault 
confirm the latter two concessions even more strongly than Defendant 
acknowledges. 
Defendant nevertheless contends that the evidence to convict him of 
burglary is insufficient because intent to commit the ulterior offense — here, 
assault—must arise before the actor unlawfully remains in the building. This 
argument, however, finds no support in the plain language of the burglary 
statute or any of Defendant's authority. More importantly, the argument is 
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directly contrary to governing Utah authority, winch states that a person is 
guilty of burglary under the statute if he forms tm intent to commit a felony, 
theft, or assault at the time he unlawfully enters a building or at any time 
thereafter while he continues to remain there unlawfully. Accordingly, the trial 
court did not commit any error, much less obvious error. 
The Court should decline to consider Defendant's second claim—that the 
common law and Utah law both require a surreptitipus element to be part of the 
"remaining unlawfully" component of burglary—because he did not preserve it 
below and does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMITT PLAIN ERROR IN 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY WHERE THE 
EVIDENCE AND GOVERNING LAW SUPPORT THAT 
DEFENDANT FORMED THE INTENT TO ASSAULT THE 
VICTIM WHILE HE UNLAWFULLY REMAINED WITHIN THE 
PREMISES 
Challenging his conviction for aggravated burglary, Defendant claims 
that "the State did not present evidence showing that he entered or remained on 
the victim's property with the intent to commit a crime, and as such failed to 
meet the elements of burglary." Aplt. Br. at 18. Specifically, Defendant argues 
that the evidence was insufficient to show that he conceived the intent to 
commit an assault while or before he remained unlawfully in Ms. VanDyke's 
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hotel room. Aplt. Br. at 20, 22-25, 27, 30. Defendant concedes that his claim 
must be analyzed under plain error because he did not preserve his 
insufficiency-of-evidence claim in the trial court. Aplt. Br. at 18-19. Defendant's 
argument fails to satisfy plain error on a couple of counts. 
A, The plain error standard of review, 
"[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including 
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances/' State v. 
Dean, 2004 UT 63,113, 95 P.3d 276 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 
P.3d 346). 
"To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in 
the verdict is undermined/" Holgate, 2000 UT 74,113 (citation omitted). "To 
demonstrate that plain error occurred in the context of a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant must show 'first that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime[s] charged and second that the 
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury/" Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 32, 55 P.3d 1131 
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(quoting Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17), cert denied, 63 P]3d 104 (brackets in original). 
"[The appellate court] first examine[s] the record tip determine whether, 'after 
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn jtherefrom in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the primefs] for which he or she 
was convicted/" " Id. at % 33 (quoting Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 18) (additional 
citation omitted)(brackets added). "Only then will [the court] undertake an 
examination of the record to determine 'whether the evidentiary defect was so 
obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury/" 
Id. (quoting Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 18)(additional citation omitted)(brackets 
added). 
B. Defendant has failed to show the trial court committed any error, 
much less plain error. 
To prove aggravated burglary in this case, the State had the burden to 
show that Defendant "remained unlawfully" in Ms. Vkn Dyke's hotel room with 
the intent to assault her and that in so doing he caused her to suffer bodily 
43-
injury. See UTAH CODE ANN. If 76-5-102 & | f 76-6-202, -203 (West 2004);3 Jury 
instruction 29, R82 
Defendant concedes that a reasonable jury could have inferred that he 
remained unlawfully in Ms. Van Dyke's hotel room when, after she asked him 
to leave, he merely "meandered" toward the door, and thereafter when she tried 
to shove him out the door. Aplt. Br. at 20,23. Indeed, a reasonable jury would 
have concluded that Defendant unlawfully remained in her room at all times 
because she never gave him permission to enter and, after he did enter, she 
repeatedly told him to get out. R130:63, 69, 73, 79. See Jury instruction 33, R86 
("A person 'enters or remains unlawfully' in or upon premises when the premises 
or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the 
3
 UTAH CODE ANN. % 76-6-202(l)(c) (West 2004), provides that" [a]n actor 
is guilty of burglary if he . . . remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of 
a building with intent to commit... an assault on any person[.]" 
UTAH CODE ANN. 176-6-203(l)(a) (West 2004), provides that" [a] person is 
guilty of aggravated burglary if in . .. committing . . . a burglary the actor . . . 
causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime[.]" 
UTAH CODE ANN. f 76-5-102(l)(c) (West 2004), provides that "[a]n assault 
. . . is an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another/' 
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public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or 
remain on the premises or such portion thereof/') (emphasis in original). 
Defendant concedes that "a reasonable jury could certainly conclude that 
[he] manifested the intent to commit assault [when he struck Ms. VanDyke in 
the forehead after she tried to shove him out the idoor.]" Aplt. Br. at 21-23. 
Indeed, by not challenging his conviction for aggravated assault, Defendant 
concedes his intent to commit assault. See State v. Bradley, 752, P.2d 874,877-78 
(Utah 1985) (holding that conviction for aggravated assault necessarily 
established crucial element of intent to prove aggravated burglary). 
And Defendant concedes "that the State presented sufficient evidence to 
show . . . that he caused bodily injury to Ms. VanDyfke. Aplt. Br. at 20. Again, 
by not challenging his conviction for aggravated assault, Defendant concedes 
that he caused Ms. Van Dyke to suffer serious bodily injury, established by 
undisputed testimony that when Defendant choked ner she intermittently lost 
consciousness. R130:63, 66. See Jury instruction 30 (requiring that to convict 
Defendant of aggravated assault jury had to find that he "[u]sed force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury to J. Felt-VapiDyke). See also State v. 
Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984) (holding thaf application of sufficient 
pressure with the hands around the neck to cause victim to black out was force 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury). 
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Despite these concessions, Defendant contends that the evidence to 
convict him of burglary is insufficient because intent to commit the assault must 
arise before the actor unlawfully remains in the building. Aplt. Br. at 20,22-24, 
25, 27, 30. Particularly, he argues that no evidence indicates that he had the 
intent to assault Ms. VanDyke until she tried to shove him out the door. Aplt. 
Br. at 24. Only at that instant, he asserts, could he reasonably have been found 
to form the intent to assault. Id. That sequence of events and their timing, 
Defendant argues, is insufficient to prove burglary because the felonious intent 
has formed only after the actor has unlawfully remained. Aplt. Br. at 25. Stated 
differently and by example, Defendant argues that burglary does not lie for the 
actor who, having been ordered from the premises, suddenly smashes his host's 
face. Without discussion of the merits of this questionable theory, the argument 
fails because it is not only unsupported by statute or relevant authority, but is 
directly contrary to governing Utah case law. 
In defining the offense of burglary as it pertains to this case, section 76-6-
202 provides that" [a]n actor is guilty of burglary if he . . . remains unlawfully in 
a building... with intent to commit... an assault on any person[.]" See UTAH 
CODE ANN. f 76-6-202(l)(c) (West 2004). Nothing in the statute requires that the 
actor form his felonious intent before he unlawfully remains on the premises. 
And based on Defendant's briefing of the authority on which he relies, none 
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appear relevant. See Aplt. Br. at 25-30. Rather, the outcomes of his cited 
authority appear uniformly to turn on the absence of sufficient intent to commit 
the ulterior offense at all, a point not disputed here. Id. The absence of any 
controlling authority in favor of Defendant's contention is reason enough to 
reject his plain error claim. See State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App 50, | 7, 228 P.3d 1255 
(rejecting plain error claim for lack of obviousness fwhere no settled appellate 
law to guide the trial court) (citations omitted). 
More importantly, Defendant's argument is cbntrary to governing Utah 
case law. In State v. Rudolph, the Utah Supreme Court held that "a person is 
guilty of burglary under section 76-6-202(1) if he forms the intent to commit a 
felony, theft, or assault at the time he unlawfully enters a building or at any time 
thereafter while he continues to remain there unlawfully" Id. at 1229 (emphasis 
added). See State v. Garcia, 2010 UT App 196,113, _^ P.3d _ (quoting Rudolph 
with approval in holding intruder "unlawfully ljemained," sufficient for 
burglary conviction, where assailant paused to assault victim as he left home). 
In short, governing law is directly contrary to Defendant's argument. 
In sum, Defendant has failed to prove that the trial court committed any 
error in submitting the case, much less plain error. 
-17-
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted July 22,2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
Addendum Jk 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102. ASSAULT 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to 
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to 
another. 
Laws 1974, c. 32, § 38; Laws 1989, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 75, § 3; Laws 1995, c. 291, 
§ 4, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 140, § 1, eff. April 29, 1^96; Laws 2000, c. 170, § 2, 
eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c. 109, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assauli as defined in Section 76-
5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another); or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely 
to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-103; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 10; Laws 1^89, c. 170, § 2; Laws 
1995, c. 291, §5, eff. May 1,1995. 
UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-6-202. Burglary 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in 
Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in 
the building. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-202; Laws 2001, c. 359, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, 
1st Sp.Sess., c. 4, § 2, eff. July 5, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 325, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-203. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from 
a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person 
who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as under Section 
76-1-601. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-203; Laws 1988, c. 174, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 6. 
